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1. Introduction   
 
This paper investigates the link between the quality of institutions and income (its 
distribution and dynamics), and the feedback that such a link has on political stability. 
Institutional quality is broadly defined to include different dimensions of governance, 
such as enforcement of property rights, efficiency of the bureaucracy, reliability of the 
judicial system, quality of the legal system, rule of law, effectiveness of government. 
The basic argument is as follows. The quality (or efficiency, which will be used as a 
synonymous of quality) of institutions affects the rate of return that individuals earn 
on investment projects. More inefficient institutions entail a larger number of 
individuals who do not undertake investment and hence end up earning a mere 
subsistence wage. Institutional inefficiency therefore lowers average per-capita 
income and increases poverty and inequality. However, growing poverty and 
inequality lessen political support to the incumbent government. When support is 
sufficiently reduced, the incumbent will be forced to take some action to prevent 
being replaced in office. A first possibility is to reform institutions, so to restore a 
minimum level of efficiency. An alternative route is to redistribute income. 
Redistribution would then imply some non-linearities in the relationship between 
institutional quality and income inequality. 
 
The research on the economic implications of the quality of institutions has 
considerably expanded over the past decade. Most papers have focused on the adverse 
effect that weak institutions have on growth, investment and productivity. 
Distributional issues have instead received relatively less attention
1. Yet some 
interesting results have emerged. On the empirical side, Gupta et al. (1998) find that 
more pervasive corruption, which is a specific form of institutional inefficiency, 
increases the Gini coefficient and reduces the average income of the poor in a cross-
section of about 40 countries. In a broader sample, Dollar and Kraay (2002) document 
a positive association between rule of law and average income of the bottom quintile 
of the population. On the theoretical side, Angeletos and Kollinztas (2000) show that 
corruption and rent-seeking activities increase income inequality in a neo-classical 
growth model. Li et al. (2000) instead consider a two-sector economy with rent-
seekers and predict maximum inequality at intermediate levels of corruption. They 
also find some econometric evidence consistent with this theoretical prediction. Ahlin 
(2001) also develops a multi-sectoral model where corruption non-linearly affects 
income distribution. 
 
Even with the recent progress of the research, this paper can add value to the 
literature in several ways. For what concerns the theoretical analysis, the paper’s 
distinctive feature is the presence of a feedback effect from inefficiency and income 
inequality to political stability. This feedback, which is consistent with a stylized fact 
recently detected in the political science literature (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), 
generates two innovative insights. One concerns the forces that drive redistribution in 
                                                 
1 On the correlation between institutions and growth, investment or productivity see, inter alia, Mauro 
(1995), Keefer and Knack (1995), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Henisz (2000), 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Lamsdorff (2003).  The level of democracy, but not the quality of 
institutions and governance, is occasionally used as explanatory variable in income inequality 
regressions; see for instance Li et al. (1998), Gradstein et al (2000), Barro (2002), Lundberg and Squire 
(2003).  
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the society. Most political-economy models rely on either the median-voter theorem 
or direct lobbying to explain the extent of redistribution
2. Here instead redistribution 
is linked to the fluctuations of political consensus and hence to the degree of 
government responsiveness to citizens and to the political quality of the opposition. 
The other insight relates to the form of the relationship between institutions and 
income inequality. In the literature, this is generally posited to be linear. In this paper, 
instead, there is a potential non-linearity stemming from the incentive of the 
government to redistribute when institutions are highly inefficient. Since the exact 
level of inefficiency that triggers redistribution depends on a number of country-
specific factors, it is possible that highly unequal countries redistribute less than more 
equal ones. The origin of non-linearities is therefore different from Li et al (1998) and 
Ahlin (2001). Moreover, these non-linearities will not necessarily take a U (or 
inverted U) shape. 
 
For what concerns the econometric analysis, the main contribution of the paper is 
to generalize and extend previous findings. First of all, most paper focus on a single 
specific aspect of institutional quality (typically, corruption) and this in turn 
constrains the choice of indicators for the empirical test. The broad notion of 
institutions adopted in this paper makes it possible to adopt various measures. This is 
interesting since different measures are likely to quantify different dimensions (of the 
same phenomenon), some of which might be more significant than others. 
Furthermore, the standard approach in the literature is to estimate only single equation 
models. However, the theoretical framework of this paper indicates that income 
dynamics and distribution are the joint outcome of institutional efficiency. Hence, a 
system of equations will be estimated along with single equations. Finally, specific 
attention is given to possible non-linearities in the relationships. This is done not just 
by squaring institutional variables on the r.h.s. of the econometric model, but also 
estimating step-wise linear regressions to detect how coefficients change at different 
initial levels of the regressors. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework. First the basic setting is introduced. Then the formation of consensus and 
political stability is studied. Finally, the use of redistribution as a way to compensate 
institutional inefficiencies is discussed. Section 3 proposes an empirical test of some 
of the predictions from Section 2. Results from a cross-section model are presented 
first. These are followed by panel estimates and then by the system of equations. 
Section 4 concludes and sets the line for future research. 
 
2.  Institutional quality, income dynamics and distribution in theory. 
 
2.1   Basic set-up: distributive implications of institutional quality 
 
Consider an economy where each individual in the population has access to a 
specific investment project. The generic project accessible by agent i is identified by 
the pair (Ri, Ci), where Ri denotes the expected rate of return and Ci is the degree of 
                                                 
2 See Harms and Zink (2003) for a survey of contributions on the political economy of redistribution. 
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interaction with institutions that the project involves.
3 Ri and Ci are randomly drawn 
from two continuous independent distributions F(R) and F(C) with compact supports 
[0, Rmax] and [0, Cmax] respectively, and with joint pdf  f(R, C) = f(R)f(C).  
 
Interacting with institutions is costly. Denote this cost by Li. Li  will be clearly 
larger the more intense interaction is, and hence the higher is Ci. However, a more 
efficient bureaucracy, a more reliable legal system, more secure property rights, 
stronger enforcement of contracts, lower incidence of corruption practices, rule of law 
and good governance are all factors that will reduce Li for any given Ci. Hence, Li will 
be decreasing in the overall degree of institutional quality. For the sake of simplicity, 
the functional form is assumed to be Li = αCi, where α denotes the inverse of 
institutional quality; that is, α is a measure of institutional inefficiency. The basic 
argument would however hold for any functional form of the type Li = g(α, C), where 
g′(•)>0. 
 
Agent i decides whether to undertake the investment project or not. In case he 
does not, then he will earn a zero income, which can be easily reinterpreted as a mere 
subsistence wage. The decision is made by comparing his utility in the two cases. 
Without loss of generality it is assumed that utility is linear in the net income level; 
that is, Ui = u(Ri - Li) = Ri - αC. Again, the key implications of the model would be 
the same if more general utility functions of the form u′(•) > 0 and u′′ (•) <0 were 
used. 
 
The condition for agent i to undertake the project (participation condition) is thus: 
 
(1)    0 ≥ − i i C R α  
 
This in turn implies that the population share P of individuals undertaking the project 
and earning a positive income can be written as: 
 
(2)    ∫∫ =
C R
C













 and  max C C = otherwise.  
 
  The implications of equation (2) can be illustrated through a simple diagram 
(Figure 1). The participation condition is summarized by the cut-off line R = C/α. 
Below the line are individuals that earn a positive income (“the rich”), above the line 
are those who do not undertake the project (“the poor”). As institutions become more 
inefficient, the cut-off line gets flatter and more people will become poor. Formally, 
this can be seen from (2), where ∂P/∂α < 0.  
 
                                                 
3 For instance Ci can be the number of patents that agent i needs to obtain from the bureaucracy, or the 
volume of business done with the public administration, or the number of times that it will be necessary 
to recur to the legal system to have contracts enforced and economic rights secured. 
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Lower quality institutions are therefore associated with a more unequal 
distribution of income. The effect shows up both as an increase in the economy’s Gini 
coefficient and as a lower average income of the poor. Average per-capita income and 
aggregate output also decrease as institutions become more inefficient. This is 
because the number of those who earn a zero income increases and the net income of 
those who earn a positive income decreases. 
 
Some additional observations are in order. If institutions were fully efficient, that 
is, if α = 0, then all individuals would participate and earn a positive income. 
However, inequality would not be removed
4. The income earned by different agents 
would still differ because of the intrinsic differences in investment opportunities, as 
summarized by the distribution of R. Therefore, institutional inefficiency is not the 
only source of income inequality in the economy. All the factors that contribute to 
determining the distribution of R will also affect inequality. In fact, whilst the 
distribution of R is assumed to be stochastic, one could link it to other variables. An 
obvious candidate would be investment in human capital. This feature of the model 
provides the theoretical justification for including various controls, in addition to 
indicators of institutional efficiency, in the econometric analysis of the determinants 
of income inequality. 
 
Finally, in this set-up, income dynamics result from the disincentive effect that 
bad institutions have on private investment. The mechanism is thus different from the 
predatory effects that often characterize the theoretical literature on rent-seeking.
5  
However, it is consistent with the idea that institutions affect growth and development 
prospects by reducing the stock of capital available for future production. 
 
2.2  The formation of consensus and political stability 
 
To survive in office governments need a minimum level of popular consensus. In 
a democracy, the electoral competition requires consensus to be gained at the time of 
elections and maintained afterwards to avoid re-calls, anticipated elections, and early 
terminations. But some popular consensus is also necessary in non-democratic 
regimes: when dissatisfaction with the government grows large, riots and coups can 
lead to a change in regime. Clearly, the level of consensus required to stay in office 
will vary across countries and over time depending on various factors that determine 
the degree of government responsiveness to citizens. Such factors will include, among 
others, the type of regime (i.e. democratic versus non-democratic, presidential vs. 
parliamentary), the set of constitutional and legal norms regulating the political 
process, the fragmentation and polarization of the political arena. 
 
To formalize the issue, let δ be the minimum consensus to remain in office. Thus, 
δ can be interpreted as an indicator of government responsiveness to people. The 
incumbent is associated with an observable level of institutional inefficiency αinc. If 
consensus falls below δ, the opposition will come into power, forming a government 
with an expected level of institutional inefficiency αopp. Agent i in the economy 
                                                 
4 This is different form Li et al. (2000), where the absence of corruption implies a Gini coefficient 
equal to zero. 
 
5 Gradstein (2004) and Neeman et al. (2003) are two recent examples of this literature. 
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supports the incumbent only if his utility is higher under the incumbent than under the 
opposition.  In case the two utilities are identical, the individual will toss a coin. This 
representation of the political process is admittedly highly simplified. A number of 
extensions will be discussed later. However, it does capture an important stylized fact 
documented by Anderson and Stverdova (2003): the attitude of citizens towards the 
government depends on the quality of institutions.  
  
To study the formation of consensus, income under the two possible alternative 
regimes (incumbent government and opposition) must be compared. Agent i’s income 
under the incumbent is: 
 
(3)   
otherwise                       0






i inc i i inc i inc i
I
C R C R I α α
 
 
and under the opposition is: 
 
(4)   
otherwise                       0






i opp i i opp i opp i
I




Comparison of equations (3) and (4) suggests that each agent in the economy will 
fall in one of four possible groups. Group 1 includes individuals whose investment 
opportunities are such that Ri  ≥  αincCi and Ri  ≥  αoppCi. Those individuals earn a 
positive income under both regimes and hence support the incumbent only if αinc < 
αopp; for αinc > αopp they will support the opposition, and for αinc = αopp they will toss 
a coin. Group 2 consists of individuals whose investment opportunities are such that 
the participation condition is met only under the incumbent. Clearly, these individuals 
will always support the incumbent. At the other extreme, Group 3 consists of 
individuals for whom the participation condition is met only under the opposition. 
Therefore, they will never support the incumbent. Finally, Group 4 includes 
individuals whose investment opportunities entail that Ri < αincCi and Ri < αoppCi. 
They will thus always toss a coin. Inspection of equations (3) and (4) also reveals that 
group 2 is empty for αinc > αopp, group 3 is empty for αinc < αopp, and both are empty 
for αinc = αalt. Figure 2 exemplifies the case of αinc < αopp 
 
Political preferences of individuals therefore are not fixed ex-ante, but result from 
the stochastic distribution of investment opportunities and the quality of the 
institutions delivered by the incumbent. Group 1 configures as “opportunistic”, 
supporting whichever regime is more efficient. Group 2 is pro-incumbent, whilst 
Group 3 is pro-opposition. These two are the counterpart of ideologically biased 
voters in models of partisan business cycle and form two polarized constituencies in 
the political arena. Group 4 is instead politically neutral since on average its support 
will always be equally split between the two contenders. The distribution of support in 
the population for different values of αinc and αopp  can be therefore summarized as in 
Table 1. 
 
From the information in Table 1 it is possible to compute the maximum level of 
institutional inefficiency that allows the incumbent to remain in office. This will be   7
equal to that value of inefficiency α* such that actual consensus is just above the 
threshold δ. Start by assuming that δ is equal to the simple majority threshold. This 
working assumption is consistent with a two-party competition in a democratic 
regime.
6  With δ = ½ the necessary and sufficient condition for the incumbent to 
survive in office is that its share of support be larger than the share of support 
received by the opposition. This will be true if αinc < αalt. In this case, in fact, the 
support for the incumbent amounts to the whole of group 1 and group 2 plus ½ of 
group 4, whilst support for the opposition only includes ½ of group 4. For αinc = αalt, a 
tie-breaking rule is required, since support for the two regimes is exactly the same (all 
non-empty groups split). Thus, the maximum level of institutional inefficiency that 
can be delivered (or tolerated) by the incumbent is  
 
(5)   α* = αopp  - ε 
 
where ε is a small positive constant. 
 
The above result has an interesting interpretation. To remain in office, the 
incumbent government cannot deliver institutions that are more inefficient than those 
expected to be delivered by the opposition. In other words, a good quality opposition, 
or an opposition which is perceived to be of good quality, will force the incumbent to 
maintain good quality institutions. In this sense, weak governance is the result of lack 
of a good and credible political opposition. 
 
The result can be generalized. For values of δ larger than ½, α* will be 
significantly smaller than αopp, thus reinforcing the positive effect that the existence of 
a good opposition has on institutional quality. For values of δ smaller than ½, the 
quality of the opposition will represent less of a constraint for the incumbent. Yet, α* 
will still be a function of αopp. Since δ is a positive function of government 
responsiveness to the citizens, one can conclude that the combination of a responsive 
government and a good political opposition is what is required to ensure that the 
efficiency of institutions will never fall too low.  
 
2.3  Extensions of the framework 
 
Two extensions that might be worth considering in future work concern 
endogenous political participation and the possibility that a change in regime will 
reshuffle the distribution of Cs across projects.  
 
In its simplest form, endogenous political participation is unlikely to generate 
major changes to the basic setting. With only a fraction of the poor actively 
expressing their support or discontent towards the government, condition (5) would 
not change. This is because the poor are either members of group 4 or of group 3. In 
the case of the politically neutral group 4, endogeneity of political participation affects 
symmetrically support for the incumbent and support for the opposition. In the case of 
group 3, endogenous participation makes a difference if that group is non-empty and 
this only happens when αopp < αinc. But with αopp < αinc support for the incumbent 
                                                 
6 In fact, two-party models under democracy are the common working hypothesis of much of the 
political economy literature (see for instance Persson and Tabellini, 2002). 
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only comes from ½ of group 4 and hence the opposition wins even if some group 3 
members do not get involved into politics. More sophisticated forms of endogenous 
participation in politics might however provide more interesting insights. 
 
The second possible extension draws on the idea that government turnover (from 
incumbent to opposition) could alter the value of C associated with each project. On 
the one hand, changes in the distribution of C can increase ex-ante individual’s 
uncertainty about the effect of political turnover. This would in turn be likely to 
induce some status-quo bias. On the other hand, if changes in the distribution are 
associated with a decrease in the average value of C (eventually linked to the fact that 
the opposition is expected to improve the overall quality of institutions), a pro-change 
bias could emerge. Future research should aim at formalizing these two channels and 
at identifying conditions under which one prevails over the other. 
  
2.4  Redistribution as a strategy to survive in office. 
 
Suppose that the level of inefficiency of institutions grows above α*. Then an 
office-motivated incumbent will have to take some action to avoid losing office. A 
first possible option is to initiate institutional reform to bring inefficiency below α*. 
An alternative strategy is to make use of redistributive fiscal policy. Indeed, the 
reason why consensus falls when institutional inefficiency increases is that income 
distribution becomes more unequal. Through redistribution the incumbent can thus 
compensate the adverse political effects of income inequality and hence stay in office 
eve if αinc is above α*. 
 
The details of the redistributive programs that the government can implement are 
worked out in a companion paper (Carmignani, 2003b). To start with, consider that 
when actual institutional inefficiency αinc is above α*, then all individuals who earn a 
positive income are in group 1. Group 1 therefore provides the tax-base to finance 
redistribution. Two factors affect this tax-base. One is actual institutional   
inefficiency: higher values of αinc reduce the size of group 1 and hence reduce the tax 
base. The other factor concerns the effect that taxation has on individual’s 
participation condition: a higher tax-rate lowers the net return from investments and 
hence drives some individuals out of group 1. The total volume of resources available 
for redistribution is therefore limited by actual institutional inefficiency and by a 
standard Laffer-type argument.  
 
The question is then how much inefficiency above α* can be compensated by 
redistributing the resources available from group 1. This is equivalent to ask what 
level of inefficiency α ~  will trigger a change in government once the incumbent is 
allowed to redistribute from group 1 to other groups. Again, computational details and 
some simulations are available from the companion paper (Carmignani 2003b). Some 
general observations can be drawn. The fact that resources available for redistribution 
are limited implies that for non-zero government responsiveness (that is, for δ > 0) α ~  
is finite. Moreover, to keep consensus at δ when αinc > α*, the incumbent needs the 
support of more individuals in group 4 and/or some individuals in group 3 . Because 
group 4 consists of individuals who earn a zero income also under the opposition, the 
transfer that the incumbent has to pay to gain their support is on average smaller than 
the transfer to be paid to gain the support of group 3 members. In other words, for the   9
incumbent it is easier (cheaper) to attract extra-support from group 4 than from group 
3 
7. Thus, the larger group 4 is, the higher α ~  will be. Because the size of group 4 
shrinks as αopp grows, then one can argue that redistribution can buy more political 
survival for the incumbent the lower the expected quality of institutions under the 
opposition. Finally α ~  will increase the lower δ is, since lower δs imply that a smaller 
consensus has to be maintained, everything else being equal.  
 
The quality of the opposition and the responsiveness of government to citizens 
therefore affect the scope for using redistribution as a political instrument. That is, in 
addition to the size of group 1 (namely, the tax-base) and the factors that determine it, 
redistribution is limited by the quality of the opposition and by government 
responsiveness. A better opposition and a more responsive government reduce the 
amount of inefficiency that can be compensated through redistribution and hence limit 
the incentive to redistribute for any given amount of resources available from group 1.  
 
The use of redistribution to compensate the loss of political support bears an 
important implication for the form of the relationship between institutional quality and 
income distribution. In the basic set-up, less efficient institutions determine more 
unequal income distributions. But as inefficiency rises, incumbent’s survival is 
threatened and redistribution used to re-gain consensus. This might generate an 
inverse correlation between inefficiency and inequality at high levels of inefficiency. 
Two factors can however complicate this correlation. First, when institutional 
inefficiency is very high, redistribution is limited by the small size of group 1. 
Second, the threshold beyond which more inefficiency triggers redistribution is a 
function of two parameters δ and αopp which are likely to be country-specific. Hence, 
it can be difficult to characterize empirically the non-linearity in cross-sectional 
samples of heterogeneous countries. 
 
3.  Some empirical evidence 
 
This section provides an empirical test of some implications of the theoretical 
framework discussed in Section 2. The focus will be on the correlation between 
institutional quality, the dynamics of income, and its distribution. The theory predicts 
that more inefficient institutions will reduce income (and growth) and increase 
inequalities. However, the political stability effect of institutional inefficiency 
complicates the relationship between institutions and inequality and makes it non-
linear. The theory also identifies institutional inefficiency as a common determinant 
of both income level (and growth) and inequality. Accordingly, the empirical test is 
first conducted within the framework of single-equation models and then extended to 
a system of equations. 
 
3.1  Econometric framework 
 
The single equation framework is written as: 
 
(7)    υ z y it t i + + + = 2 itβ X 1 0 , β β  
                                                 
7 Note that attracting support from group 3 amounts to filling group 2 with individuals that before 
redistribution are in group 3. 
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where  z is an index of institutional quality (to be discussed later), X is a set of 
controls, i indicates a generic country in the sample, t denotes time, βs are parameters 
to be estimated and υ is the error term. Four different dependent variables will be 
used: average per-capita income, its growth rate, the Gini coefficient, the average 
income level of the bottom quintile of the population. The first two serve to study 
income dynamics, the other two are for the analysis of income distribution and 
poverty.  
 
Different methodologies have been suggested in the literature for the estimation of 
(7). One way to proceed is to estimate a parsimonious specification where no controls 
are added to the institutional variable z on the r.h.s. The underlying hypothesis is that 
whilst the quality of institutions is determined by a broad set of factors, those factors 
affect the dependent variable only through institutional quality. Instrumental variables 
(IV) can be then applied to obtain consistent estimates 
8. If instead one believes that 
institutional quality is not the only determinant of income dynamics and distribution, 
then a richer specification of the r.h.s. is required. This in turn rises the problem of 
selecting the appropriate controls and to test the sensitivity of results to changes in the 
composition of X. The problem is particularly well-documented for income and 
growth regressions 
9. Moreover, Caselli et al. (1996) point out specific deficiencies of 
standard least squares estimators for income and growth regressions that include a 
lagged dependent variable. They therefore propose to estimate (7) in first differences, 
using appropriate lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments. The pragmatic 
strategy pursued in this paper is to make use of all the different methodologies and 
compare results to check their robustness.  
 
The system of equations consists instead of the pair: 
 
(8a)    it it it u z Income + + + = 2 itω W 1 0 ω ω  
(8b)     it it it e z Gini + + + = 2 itψ S 1 0 ψ ψ  
 
where Income is average income (or growth), Gini is the Gini coefficient, z is an 
indicator of institutional quality, W and S are set of controls, ψs and ωs are 
parameters to be estimated, u and e are disturbances such that E[e] = E[u] = 0 and 
E[eu] = Σ. The two set of controls W and S can have some of the variables in 
common. Estimation of the system (8a)-(8b) is by GLS and IV (3SLS). 3SLS also 
allows to account for the joint endogeneity that occurs when W includes Gini and/or S 
includes income. 
 
A final issue concerns the possible non-linearity in the relationship between 
institutional quality and income distribution. The common approach in this case is to 
include  z
2 in addition to z on the r.h.s. of the Gini regressions (Li et al. 2000). 
However, as previously discussed, the non-linearity predicted by the theory does not 
necessarily take a U shape. For this reason, in addition to the inclusion of the square 
term, step-wise linear regressions will be estimated. In this case, the sample will be 
                                                 
8 See Hall and Jones (1999), Kaufmann et al. (1999), Neeman et al. (2003). 
 
9 See for instance Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
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partitioned in sub-samples on the basis of values of z (high, intermediate, low) and 
linear regressions will be estimated for each sub-sample. Then, the estimated 
coefficients on z will be compared to see how the relationship changes across sub-
samples.   
 
3.2.  Sample and data 
 
The full sample includes 136 countries observed over the period 1960-2000. Five-
year averages are taken for each variable, so that for each country the panel has a 
maximum of eight observations (1960-64, 1965-69,…, 1995-2000). Sources and 
variables description are reported in the Appendix. The parsimonious version of 
equation (7) is estimated on a pure cross-section of observations for the sub-period 
1995-2000 (1990-94 for a very few countries). All the other specifications, including 
the system of equations (8a)-(8b) are estimated on a panel that only includes countries 
for which at least two observations are available. 
 
To carry out the analysis, empirical measures of institutional quality are needed. A 
number of indicators are now available. Kaufmann et al. (2003) collect bi-annual 
observations over the period 1996-2002 for six indicators of governance: 
effectiveness of government, rule of law, control of corruption, regulatory burden, 
political instability and violence, voice and accountability (i.e. civil liberties). The 
first four of them appear to be particularly close to the general definition of 
institutional efficiency maintained in Section 2. The main weakness of this data-set is 
its limited time-coverage, which implies that the indicators cannot be used in a panel 
analysis.  
 
A longer time-dimension is available for the index of Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW), published at five-year intervals since 1970. EFW measures the 
consistency of policies and institutions with economic freedom. The aggregate EFW 
index is obtained from the aggregation of indicators that are grouped into five 
clusters. These are: size of government and the public sector, quality of the legal 
structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to exchange 
with foreigners, quality of regulation of credit, labour and business. The index 
therefore constitutes a good proxy of the theoretical notion of institutional quality. 
Particularly relevant seems to be the cluster on the quality of the legal structure and 
security of property rights, which will be singled out in the analysis below. Henisz 
(2000) also provides an index of institutional quality that dates back to 1960. This 
index measures the degree of constraints on policy change in a country. The 
underlying theoretical argument is that constraints can work as a device to enforce 
government’s commitments, especially for what concerns the enforcement of property 
rights. Moreover, checks and balances in the legislative process (a specific type of 
constraints) allow the voters to hold the elected officials more accountable  and 
therefore helps minimize rent-seeking incentives in the political process. 
 
All of the above mentioned indices are subjective measures of institutional quality. 
Merits and limits of subjective indicators have been discussed in the political 
economy literature
10. It is therefore desirable to make also use of more objective 
                                                 
10 See Carmignani (2003a) and references therein. 
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proxies. Clague et al. (1999) propose to use contract intensive money as proportion of 
total M2. Contract intensive money is defined as the part of M2 that is not currency in 
circulation outside banks. Hence, the index of institutional quality is computed as the 
ratio of M2 minus currency in circulation to M2. The underlying intuition is that if 
institutions are of a poor quality, then individuals will mostly engage in transactions 
that are self-enforceable. Typically, those transactions are carried out through 
currency. Hence a higher proportion of currency in circulation (that is, a smaller 
proportion of contract intensive money) will denote a lower institutional quality. 
Clague et al. (1999) report for this index sufficiently high correlations with other 
subjective indicators. Moreover, it can be easily computed for many countries on 
annual basis for long periods of time. Its main disadvantage is that it significantly 
correlates with indicators of financial development, which are in turn often included 
as control variables in both income and Gini regressions. 
 
Table 2 reports the pair-wise correlations between the various indicators of 
institutional quality
11.  Governance is the simple average of the four relavant 
indicators in the Kaufmann et al.’s dataset; polcon is the indicator proposed by Henisz 
(2000);  efw is the index of economic freedom and legal is its component that 
explicitely refers to the quality of the legal system and the security of property rights; 
cim is the contract-intensive money indicator of Clague et al. (1999). Correlations are 
reported for two different samples: the cross-section including only the latest 
observation for each country and the panel including all observations for all countries. 
Of course, given the lack of time-dimension in the Kaufmann’s data-set, correlations 
with  governance  are only computed for the cross-section sample. As expected, 
correlations are generally high and positive, but almost always significantly smaller 
than 1. This means that different indicators capture different dimensions of the same 
broad phenomenon. 
 
3.2  Evidence from cross-section regressions 
 
The first piece of evidence comes from the estimation of a parsimonious version 
of (7) on the cross-sectional sample. Each of the four dependent variables is thus 
regressed on a constant and on each of the indicators of institutional quality. 
Following Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann et al (1999), estimation is by 
instrumental variables. Instruments include variables that in the literature have been 
found to determine directly the quality of governance, but not the dependent variables. 
These are: country’s latitude, legal origin dummies, ethnic fractionalization, the share 
of protestants in the population.
12.  
 
Results of cross-section regressions are displayed in Table 3. The first four 
columns show that higher quality institutions significantly reduce income inequality 
and increase average income, income of the poor, and average income growth. Note 
                                                 
11 Throughout the rest of this section, higher values of the institutional variables denote better 
institutions.¨ 
 
12 The search for appropriate instruments is another highly debated issue in the literature. Latitude, 
legal origins and various measures of ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalization are however the 
most widely used.  The tests of over-identifying restrictions (not reported, but available upon request) 
broadly support this choice of instruments. 
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that the different size of coefficients across institutional indicators reflect the different 
scale over which such indicators are measured. It is however interesting to note that 
for each institutional variable, the estimated coefficients in the average income and in 
the income of the poor regressions are very close. This implies that improving 
institutions yields the same payoff to both the average citizen and the average poor.
13 
 
The last three columns of the table account for possible non-linearities. Results are 
reported for governance, but they are very similar to those obtained for other 
institutional variables. When including a squared term (column 5), the pattern of 
coefficients is consistent with an inverted U-shape relationship between Gini and 
governance. Estimated coefficients are however less precisely estimated. The step-
wise linear regressions (column 6) confirms that the relationship changes sign at low 
levels of efficiency. When institutions are of a poor quality, a further deterioration 
will lead to lower (rather than higher) Gini. Similarly, at initial low values of 
efficiency, the income of the poor increases when institutional quality worsens. The 
theory of Section 2 explains this finding through the feedback that institutions have on 
political stability and hence on the incentive of the incumbent to redistribute. 
   
3.3  Panel regressions of income inequality and poverty 
 
The next piece of evidence comes from the estimation of a richer specification of 
(7) on a panel sample using instrumental variables. Instruments now include latitude, 
dummies for legal origins, and lagged values of regressors. Of the institutional 
variables,  governance cannot be used because it only has the cross-sectional 
dimension. Moreover, since the aggregate index efw turns out to include sub-
components that are highly correlated with some of the economic controls, only its 
sub-component legal is used. 
 
The specification of the r.h.s. of the model builds on some key results in the 
income inequality literature
14.  Schooling measures educational achievements, 
government is government consumption, M2 proxies the depth of the financial system, 
and initial income accounts for the interaction between economic development and 
income distribution. Gradstein et al. (2000) reports some significant inequality effects 
associated with country’s dominant religion, which in turn is a proxy for ideology. 
The three dummies buddhist, confucian, and muslim capture these incremental effect 
over Judeo-Christian societies. Similarly, communist is a dummy that isolates the 
impact of the communist ideology. A dummy variable (income dummy) is used to take 
into account the difference between Gini data based on income and expenditures. 
When the institutional quality is measured by cim, M2 and initial income have to be 
dropped from the set of controls to avoid multi-collinearity problems.  
 
Results are reported in Table 4. The first-three columns broadly confirm the 
evidence from the cross-section regression: higher institutional quality reduces the 
Gini coefficient. This result holds when the set of controls is further expanded. In 
                                                 
13 In fact, because the coefficients in the average income regression are slightly smaller for four out five 
indicators, one could argue that the payoff from improving institutions is actually slightly higher for the 
average poor. 
 
14 See Li et al. (1998) and Lindberg and Squire (2003) 
   14
columns 4 to 6 inflation, trade openness and a square term on initial income (to 
account for the Kuznets hypothesis) are added to the r.h.s of the Gini regressions. The 
coefficient on legal remains negative and statically significant. Results for polcon are 
qualitatively the same, whilst the coefficient on cim looses significance in the 
regression with squared income. The last column measures the correlation between 
institutional quality and the income of the poor. The specification of the r.h.s. includes 
average income, as suggested by Dollar and Kraay (2002). The positive coefficient on 
legal confirms that the income of the poor increases the better the institutional 
environment (again, results for polcon and cim are qualitatively very similar to those 
obtained for legal).  
 
A few findings concerning the other economic controls are worth a mention. 
There is quite a systematic evidence of an ideology effect, particularly for what 
concerns Muslim and communist countries. This is broadly consistent with Gradstein 
et al. (2000). Less systematic is the evidence on schooling, government and M2: their 
estimated coefficients do not seem to be particularly robust to changes in the 
specification of the regression model. Yet, one might infer an inequality-reducing 
effect of educational achievements and depth of the financial system, whilst larger 
governments tend to be associated with more inequalities. This latter finding certainly 
deserves further investigation
15. Finally, the correlation between contemporaneous 
average income and income of the poor is positive, but largely smaller than one. This 
stands in contrast with the results reported by Dollar and Kraay (2002) of a one-to-one 
proportionality between the two. In fact, this one-to-one proportionality shows up if 
income of the poor is regressed only on a constant and on average income. But when 
legal is added, whatever set of other controls is used, the estimated coefficient on 
average income drops to 0.49. 
16 
 
Non-linearities in the relationship are tested in Table 5. The first two-columns 
present the regressions with squared terms on legal and polcon (results for cim are 
similar). The pattern of coefficients is consistent with an inverted U shaped 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and institutional quality. This non-linear 
shape however finds only mild support from the regressions of the income of the poor 
(columns 3 and 4). The sign of the coefficients suggest that worse institutions reduce 
the income of the poor at higher levels of institutional efficiency and increase it at 
lower levels of efficiency. But the estimated coefficients hardly pass a zero restriction 
test. 
 
The step-wise linear regressions also provide a mixed picture. First of all, the 
partition of the sample into sub-samples based on values of the institutional variable 
                                                 
15 Since government is instrumented by its lagged values, it is unlikely that the estimated coefficient 
reflects a reverse-causation effect from Gini to government. 
 
16 A regression of income of the poor (yp) on average income (y) and legal yields the following result : 
 
yp = 1.018 + 0.4906y + 0.3895 legal 
 
with all coefficients being significant at 1% level of confidence. Interestingly, Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
do control for a measure of institutional quality. However, they use a time-invariant measure even 
though the sample period spans over a few decades. Thus, differences in the measurement of 
institutional quality might be the source of the discrepancy in the results between this paper and theirs. 
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presents some inconveniences: within each sub-sample economic variables highly 
correlates and religious dummies show practically no variation. Therefore, more 
parsimonious specifications drawn from Li et al (1998) are estimated. These include, 
in addition to the institutional variable, schooling  and  M2 
17. But even with this 
approach, coefficients are estimated quite imprecisely, as shown by large standard 
errors. The coefficients on legal do not seem to change sign across sub-samples. 
However, it appears that the strength of the inverse correlation between institutional 
quality and Gini vanishes at low values of legal. That is, worsening institutional 
quality is less likely to result in a more unequal income distribution if institutions are 
already highly inefficient. 
 
3.4  Panel regressions of income and growth 
 
Table 6 reports the evidence obtained from income and growth regressions. 
Different methodologies have been used in the literature to estimate equation (7) 
when income (or growth) is the dependent variable. A first basic approach is to 
estimate the income regression in levels using lagged values as instruments for the 
controls. This is done in the first three columns of the table. The set of controls 
include educational attainments (schooling), government consumption to GDP ratio 
(government), the depth of financial intermediation (M2), lagged average income, an 
indicator of openness to trade (openness) and an indicator of the degree of 
urbanization of the society (urbanization). The positive estimated coefficients on 
legal, polcon and cim substantiate a positive income-effect of good institutions. The 
inclusion of the Gini coefficient among the set of controls does not alter the key result 
on institutions (column 4 for legal; results for polcon and cim available upon request). 
 
Next, following the criticisms of Caselli et al (1996), a first difference 
transformation of the basic regression in levels is estimated. This is equivalent to 
regressing the growth rate of income between sub-periods on lagged growth and 
changes in control variables between the same sub-periods. Lagged values of 
regressors are used as instruments. Results are displayed in column 5 for the variable 
legal. The estimated coefficient remains positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level of confidence. The finding for polcon is analogous, with the coefficient 
being significant at slightly more than 5% confidence. The coefficient on cim instead 
is just below significance (p-value is 0.1103).  
 
Column 6 reports the results from estimating a standard Barro-type growth 
regression. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of income in 
each sub-period and the regressors are instrumented by their lagged values  Again, the 
effect of good quality institutions is positive and statistically different from zero. In 
column 7, the dependent variable is the investment to GDP ratio, rather than income 
growth. The importance of estimating an investment regression stems directly from 
the theoretical analysis in Section 2. Institutions affect income and growth through 
their effect on individual’s incentive to invest. Therefore, better quality institutions 
should be associated with higher investment to GDP ratios. The positive estimated 
coefficient on legal in column 7 substantiates this hypothesis.  
 
                                                 
17 To try to limit the size of an already big table, the estimated coefficients on schooling and M2 in the 
step-wise linear regressions are not reported, but they are available upon request. 
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For what concerns the other control variables, it is worth noting that the estimated 
coefficient on lagged income is smaller than one in all specifications. This implies 
conditional convergence. The positive effect of education and financial development 
also appears to be quite robust. Particularly strong is the marginal impact of the depth 
of the financial system on the investment to GDP ratio. Government consumption to 
GDP is instead found to hamper growth and reduce investment. Finally, there is little 
evidence of any additional impact of openness to trade and urbanization. 
 
Finally, the theoretical analysis does not provide univocal predictions on non-
linearities in the relationship between institutional quality and income level (or 
growth). When, at low levels of efficiency a further deterioration of institutions leads 
the government to redistribute, the net effect on average income can be positive or 
negative. On the one hand, redistribution might be harmful for growth, since it implies 
higher taxation and hence lower return on investments. On the other hand, if the poor 
can use the transfers they receive to undertake investment, then redistribution might 
contribute to growth, in addition to reducing inequality. In column 8 the income 
regression is re-estimated including legal squared in addition to the linear term. The 
coefficient on the squared term is however largely insignificant, thus suggesting that 
the non-linear specification might not be appropriate. 
 
3.5   The system of equations 
 
The final piece of evidence stems from the estimation of the system of equations 
(8a)-(8b). The two dependet variables are the Gini coefficient and average income. 
The specification of each equation is the same as in the single-equation framework. 
The estimation methods are SURE and 3SLS. Only results for 3SLS are reported, 
those obtained from SURE are not qualitatively different
18. Instruments include 
latitude, legal origins, and lagged values of the regressors. Results are displayed in 
Table 7. 
  
In the first three columns, a non-simultaneous system is estimated. Institutional 
quality has a clear inequality-reducing effect. The income-effect instead significantly 
shows up only when quality is measured by legal. Columns (5), (6), and (7) 
incorporate a non-linear effect in the Gini equation, but not in the income equation. In 
fact, the previous evidence from the single-equation framework suggests to impose a 
zero restriction on the coefficient of the squared institutional variable in the income 
equation. For legal and polcon, the evidence of an inverted U-shaped interaction in 
the Gini equation is quite strong. At the same time, the coefficients on the linear 
institutional variables in the income equation do not change substantially
19. The last 
two columns estimate the system of simultaneous equations, with income among the 
set of controls in the Gini equation and Gini among the controls in the income 
equation. The estimated coefficients on the institutional variables remain quite similar 
to those obtained from the non-simultaneous system.  
 
                                                 
18 SURE is not used when the system is simultaneous.  
  
19 The Wald test never rejects the zero restriction on the squared term. Allowing for non-linearities in 
the income equation does not change results in the Gini equation and the squared institutional variable 
in the income equation  always has a largely insignificant coefficient. 
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The estimation of a system of equations also confirm the important role of several 
other controls. More schooling and more developed financial markets both work in 
the sense of reducing inequality and increasing average income. There it thus a 
potentially large payoffs for governments in promoting policies to facilitate access to 
education at all levels and to deepen financial intermediation. Expanding government 
consumption in percent of GDP has instead perverse effects. A larger government 
consumption share is in fact associated with a higher Gini coefficient and with lower 
growth. Of the variables that are not included in both models, some of the 
religious/ideology dummies continue to display significant coefficients in the Gini 
equations. Openess to trade and urbanization instead appear to have no relevant 
impact on income. Finally, income is a determinant of Gini, whilst Gini does not seem 
to significantly affect income. 
 
4.  Conclusions and directions of future research 
 
In the theoretical model, inefficient institutions alter individual’s investment 
decisions. This has effects on both income distribution and income dynamics. Lower 
quality institutions increase the degree of income inequality and reduce average 
income in the economy. However, at high level of institutional inefficiency, income 
inequality is such that the survival in office of the incumbent is threatened. This 
implies that either institutional reforms are introduced to restore efficiency or 
redistribution is used to compensate the poor. The use of redistribution then creates 
the possibility for non-linearities: at lower levels of institutional efficiency, a further 
deterioration of institutions reduces (instead of increasing) inequalities. 
 
Some of the key theoretical predictions are supported by the econometric analysis. 
The quality of institutions inversely correlates with the Gini coefficient and positively 
correlates with income (and growth). The effect is particularly evident when empirical 
measures of governance and effectiveness of the legal system are used to proxy the 
efficiency of institutions. The basic econometric findings are robust to changes in the 
specification of the empirical models and to the estimation of a system of equations. 
There is also evidence that at higher levels of inefficiency, the sign of the relationship 
between institutions and Gini might be reversed or, at least, that it becomes 
statistically insignificant. Whether the non-linear specification is preferable to the 
linear one is however quite difficult to establish. A specification test (Ramsey, 1969) 
applied to both the cross-sectional sample and the panel generally indicates the 
superiority of the linear specification. Yet, as well-known from the econometric 




In addition to what already mentioned in the text, two main lines for future 
research are left open. On the theoretical side, there is need to formalize incumbent’s 
choice between reform and redistribution when consensus falls below the survival 
threshold. This in turn requires the definition of a model of timing and depth of 
institutional reforms and a more careful specification of redistributive programs
21. 
                                                 
20 The results of the Ramsey test are not reported in Section 3 to save space. However they are 
available upon request. 
 
21 Some steps in this direction are already proposed in Carmignani (2003b). 
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Such an extension would therefore make institutions endogenous to the economic 
process, along the lines discussed in Besley and Case (2004). For what concerns the 
empirical part, not all of the implications of the theoretical model have been brought 
to the data. In fact, Section 3 focuses on the correlations between institutions, income 
distribution and income dynamics. There are at least two other correlations that can be 
tested. One is the impact of institutional quality/income inequality on government 








Description and source 
Governance 
 
Index of quality of governance, obtained as simple average of 
four clusters: Government effectiveness, Control of corruption, 










Index of legal structure and security of property rights (judicial 
independence, impartiality of courts, protection of intellectual 
property, military interference in rule of law and the political 
process, integrity of the legal system). It is one of the five 
components of Efw. Sources: Economic Freedom of the World, 




Index of Economic Freedom of the World. Includes the 
following components: size of government, legal structure and 
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to exchange 
with foreigners, regulation of credit, labour and business. 




Contract intensive money. It is defined as the ratio of M2 minus 
currency in circulation outside banks to total M2. The original 
definition is from Clague et al. (1999). Source: computed from 




Gini coefficient. Sources: UN-WIDER dataset, UNECE 
Economic Survey of Europe 2004, Dollar and Kraay (2002), 




Average per-capita GDP in real terms. Sources: Penn World 
Tables. 
 
Income of the poor 
 
Average per-capita income of the bottom quintile of the 
population. It is computed from Gini and income shares data as 
the share of the bottom quintile times average per-capita income   19









Dummy variable taking value 1 if Gini data refers to income (as 




Dummy variable taking value 1 if Islam is the dominant religion 




Dummy variable taking value 1 if Buddhism is the dominant 




Dummy variable taking value 1 if Confucianism is the dominant 




Dummy variable taking value 1 if country is communist. 




Average number of years of schooling in total adult population. 









Index of financial depth. It is computed as the ratio of M2 to 




Average annual change in consumer price index. Sources: 




Total international trade (exports plus imports) in percent of 














Dummy variable taking value 1 if country has British, or 





Index of ethnic fractionalization of the population. Source: 




Share of protestants in total population. Sources: La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Alesina et al. (2003).   20
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Table 1: Groups of consensus in the population 
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Table 2: Pair-wise correlations between indicators of institutional quality 
  Governance 
 
Polcon Legal  Efw  Cim 
Governance 
 
  0.7019 0.9372 0.8559 0.5925 
Polcon 
 































Notes: The table reports simple bilateral correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients in the cross-
section sample are reported in normal black. Correlation coefficients in the panel sample are reported in 
bold. Governance is not included in the panel sample and hence no correlation coefficients are 
computed.   21
 











































































   
Govern. sq 
 
      -0.347*    
Govern. high 
 
















Notes. The first four columns reports estimated coefficients from the parsimonious specification of 
equation (7). Each regression includes only one institutional variable at the time. However, estimated 
coefficients obtained from regressions with the same dependent variable are all reported in the same 
column. The number in parenthesis are the number of observations for each regression. The fifth 
column reports the results from the estimation of the parsimonious specification with the addition of a 
squared term on governance. The last two columns report the results of the step-wise linear regressions.  
* ** *** denotes statistically significant coefficients at respectively 10%, 5%, 1% level of confidence. 
Estimation is by 2SLS. Instruments include: index of ethnic fractionalization, legal origins dummy, 
latitude, share of protestants in the population. Estimated constant terms are not reported. 
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Table 4. Panel regressions of income inequality and income of the poor 




















0.223*** 0.228*** 0.370** 0.229*** 0.224*** 0.188***   
Muslim 
 
-0.178***  -0.107* -0.024 -0.141**  -0.184***  -0.160***   
Buddhist 
 
-0.027 -0.1** -0.264 -0.039 -0.029 -0.084   
Confucian 
 
0.038 -0188** -0.085  0.011  0.006  -0.005   
Communist 
 
-0.112 -0.427***  -0.948** -0.159  -0.095 -0185**   
Schooling 
 
-0.107* -0.067 0.884* -0.089 -01.08*  -0.124***  0.107 
Government 
 
0.437 0.884*** -0.082  0.210  0.37  0.498** -0.214 
M2 
 




0.135* 0.134*    0.078  0.134*  0.952***   
Leg 
 
-0.168***     -0.145***  -0.167***  -0.082** 0.286*** 
Polcon 
 
  -0.693**       
Cim 
 
   - 10.812**      
Inflation 
 








      -0.043***   
Income 
 
       0.484*** 
N. OBS. 
 
242 235 282 225 235 235 202 
Notes:  Estimation is by 2SLS. Instruments include lagged values of regressors, latitude and dummy for 
legal origins. * ** *** denotes statistically significant coefficients at respectively 10%, 5%, 1% level of 
confidence Estimated constant terms are not reported 
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0.213*** 0.189***         
Muslim 
 
-0.079* -0.078*         
Buddhist 
 
-0.078 -0.222***      
Confucian 
 
-0.016 -0.044         
Communist 
 
-0.177** -0.304***      
Schooling 
 
-0.076* -0.108***  0.019 0.169**     
Government 
 
0.554** 0.951***  -0.798  -1.192***    
M2 
 
-0.164* -0.234***  0.592*** 0.853***    
Initial  income 
 
0.05 0.064*         
Inflation 
 




   -0.135  -0.162*     
Legal 
 
0.201**   -0.361     
Legal sq. 
 
-0.026***   0.049**     
Polcon 
 
 0.965***    -0.531     
Polcon sq. 
 
 -1.478***   0.737    
Legal high 
 






















       
N.OBS 
 
198  242 202 241    
Notes. In Columns 5 and 6 the coefficients from piece-wise linear regressions are reported only for the 
institutional variables (the other control variables include income dummy, schooling and M2). The 
number in parenthesis indicate the number of observations used for each piece-wise linear regression.  
* ** *** denotes statistically significant coefficients at respectively 10%, 5%, 1% level of confidence. 
Estimation is by 2SLS. Instruments include lagged values of the explanatory variables, latitude and 
legal origins. Estimated constant terms are not reported   24



















0.047*** 0.034***  -0.021  0.048*  -0.229*  0.012**  0.016**  0.052*** 
Government 
 
-0.43***  -0.428***  -0.37***  -0.654***  -0.093  -0.084***  -0.139*** -0.48*** 
M2 
 








0.014 0.005 0.008 0.02 -0.081 0.005 0.001  0.023 
Urbanization 
 
0.023 0.106 0.081 -0.04 0.275 0.002 0.013   
Legal 
 
0.03**     0.038***  0.072*  0.005** 0.008** 0.061* 
Polcon 
 
 0.183**            
Cim 
 
   0.703*        
Gini 
 
    -0.002     -0.004   
Legal sq. 
 
        -0.004 
N.Obs 
 
365 417 506  198 276 293 198  293 
Notes: The first four columns report estimates from a standard regression in levels. Estimation is by 
2SLS using lagged values of explanatory variables, latitude, and legal origins as instruments. Column 
(5) reports estimates obtained from a first difference version of the basic growth regression, following 
Caselli et al. (1996). Lagged values of explanatory variables are used as instruments. Column (6) reports 
estimates from a regression of average annual growth rate on explanatory variables. Estimation is by 
2SLS with lagged values, latitude and legal origins as instruments. Same instruments are used for the 
investment regression in column (7). 
Estimated constant terms not reported. * ** *** denotes statistically significant coefficients at 
respectively 10%, 5%, 1% level of confidence. Estimated constant terms are not reported 
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 Table 7: System of equations 
Gini equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Income 
dummy 
0.226*** 0.192*** 0.135*** 0.222*** 0.202*** 0.134*** 0.228*** 0.182*** 
Muslim 
 
-0.056 -0.086**  -0.089**  -0.043 -0.088**  -0.096**  -0.078*  -0.090** 
Buddhist 
 
-0.032 -0.136***  -0.098**  -0.039 -0.21***  -0.105**  -0.092 -0.135*** 
Confucian 
 
0.043  -0.060 -0.011 0.025  -0.068 -0.014 -0.002 -0.07 
Communist 
 
-0.098 -0.365***  -0.128 -0.139 -0.37***  -0.139*  -0.176*  -0.353*** 
Schooling 
 
-0.095*** -0.078*** -0.175*** -0.085**  -0.073*** -0.169*** -0.057  -0.087*** 
Government 
 
0.653*** 0.677*** 0.705*** 0.532*** 0.694*** 0.704*** 0.479**  0.697*** 
M2 
 
-0.222*** -0.238***   -0.204*** -0.16***    -0.150**  -0.253*** 
Initial 
income 
      -0.063*  0.016 
Legal 
 
-0.036***    0.098**    -0.028***   
Legal sq. 
 
   - 0 . 0 1 2 * * *       
Polcon 
 
 -0.193***    0.572***    -0.206*** 
Polcon sq. 
 
    - 0 . 9 7 * * *      
Cim 
 
  .0.232    1.36    
Cim sq. 
 
     - 0 . 7 6 7     
Income equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Schooling 
 
0.050*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047**  0.047*** 
Government 
 
-0.506*** -0.592*** -0.507*** -0.041  -0.529*** -0.527*** -0.488*** -0.588*** 
M2 
 
0.144*** 0.174***   0.143*** 0.174***   0.138*** 0.174*** 
Trade open. 
 
0.020 0.018 0.044*** 0.022 0.016 0.043*** 0.017 0.016 
Urbanization 
 
-0.039 0.044  -0.051 -0.041 0.046  -0.053 -0.038 0.048 
Lag. Income 
 
0.927*** 0.921*** 0.961*** 0.927*** 0.921*** 0.962*** 0.93***  0.920*** 
Gini 
 
      -0.02  -0.008 
Legal 
 
0.017***     0.017***     0.016***  
Polcon 
 
 -0.002    -0.004    -0.003 
CIM 
 
  0.128    0.126    
N.Obs  198 242 260 198 242 260 198 242 
 Notes: Estimation is by 3SLS. Instruments include lagged values of explanaotory variables, latitude., 
legal origin dummies. * ** *** denotes statistically significant coefficients at respectively 10%, 5%, 
1% level of confidence. Estimated constant terms are not reported 
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Figure 1.             
                                         α / C R =            
       C                                                       P = participants (participation condition met) 
Cmax                                                          N = non-participants (participation condition not met) 
 




                                                   Rmax       R 
 
Figure 2 
                                             inc C R α / =                                         
        C                                
    Cmax 
 
                                                                  opp C R α / =  
              Group 4     Group  2 
 
                                        Group 1 
 
                                                 Rmax       R 
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